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Judicial Review in an Integrated Administration
Judicial Review in an Integrated
Administration: The Case of the
Habitats Directive
Mariolina Eliantonio (Faculty of Law,
Maastricht University)*
I. Introduction
The right to an effective legal remedy is a generally
accepted principle of modern legal systems and is
enshrined in national constitutions as well as interna-
tional treaties, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.1 On the
EU level, the general principle of effective judicial
protection was identified for the first time in the
Johnston case,2 and later came to be considered as
general principle of Community law.3 Lastly, the
principle of effective judicial protection has been
incorporated in Article 47 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union.
The exercise of this right by individuals may
sometimes be called into question, however, by the
emergence of the system of shared administration.
This system refers to situations in which decision-
making is carried out through acts issued by European
as well as national bodies through ``multi-phase
processes''. While the systems of decision-making are
increasingly more intertwined, the system judicial
review remains attached to a dualistic approach,
which is based on a strict separation between the EU
and the national level of jurisdictions.
The aim of this paper is to show how the operation
of the system of shared administration may pose
problems for the system of judicial accountability,
ultimately creating gaps of judicial protection and,
thereby, endangering the exercise of the right to an
effective remedy. The analysis will be carried out using
the case study of a piece of legislation which sets up a
system of shared administration, i.e. the Habitats
Directive,4 and the German legal system, where a
significant amount of litigation on this Directive took
place. After an introduction to the system of shared
administration and the Habitats Directive, for each
stage of the decision-making, the paper will examine
which form of judicial protection is guaranteed to
individuals, and the gaps of judicial protection will be
identified and discussed. Following this analysis, it will
be shown which steps on European as well as on
national level might be taken in the future in order to
fill the currently existing of judicial protection.
II. The Move Towards an
``Integrated''Administration5
Traditionally, the schemes for the administrative
implementation of European law have been categor-
ized into direct and indirect administration, in
accordance with the general framework of executive
federalism.6 Under this model, European law would
mainly be implemented by the Member States through
their national authorities, while in exceptional cases it
would be the European institutions in charge of giving
* m.eliantonio@maastrichtuniversity.nl, Assistant Profes-
sor in European Administrative Law.
1 See Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.
2 Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. See, more
recently, case C-432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd, Unibet
(International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271,
in which the Court held that ``according to settled case-law,
the principle of effective judicial protection is a general
principle of Community law stemming from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, which has
been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms''(para. 37). A similar consideration
is made in case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und
Beratungsgesellschaft v Germany [2010] ECR I-13849 (para.
29); case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR I-6653,
para. 49 (`whilst it is, in principle, for national law to
determine an individual's standing and legal interest in
bringing proceedings, [EU] law nevertheless requires, in
addition to observance of the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness, that the national legislation does not under-
mine the right to effective judicial protection''). Further on
this principle and its implications, see Sacha Prechal and
Rob Widdershoven ``Redefining the Relationship between
`Rewe-effectiveness' and Effective Judicial Protection'',
Review of European Administrative Law (2011), 31-50.
3 See e.g. Case C-125/01, Peter PfluÈcke v Bundesanstalt fuÈr
Arbeit [2003] ECR I-9375.
4 For a similar analysis with regard to the gaps of judicial
protection in the system of plant protection products, see
Andrea Keessen, ``Reducing the Judicial Deficit in Multi-
level Environmental Regulation: the Example of Plant
Protection Products'', European Energy and Environmental
Law Review (2007), 26.
5 Please note that this section is included in an article by the
same author entitled: ``Judicial Review in an Integrated
Administration: the Case of Composite Procedure'', cur-
rently under review with the Common Market Law Review.
6 Jurgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet
and Maxwell, 1992), 25-47; Stefan Kadelbach, ``European
Administrative Law and the Law of a Europeanised
Administration'' in Christian Joerges and Renaud Dehousse
(Eds.) Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market
(Oxford University Press, 2002), 167; Jacques Ziller,
Introduction ± Les concepts d'administration directe,
d'administration indirecte et de co-administration et les
fondements du droit administratif europeen''in Jean-Ber-
nard Auby et Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere (Eds.) TraiteÂ
de Droit Administratif Europeen (Bruylant, 2014), 327 ff.
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effect to European policies. Depicting in this way the
current models of implementation of EU law, would,
however, hardly do justice to its complexity and
would, in particular, ignore the fact that increasingly
more and more forms of cooperation have been set up
across the different levels.7 As has been argued, ``it is
difficult to identify an area of administrative activity in
the EU which is purely either direct or indirect
administration''.8
In particular, in the past years, several procedures
have been set up in order to set in place mechanisms so
as to enable cooperation in administering the different
policy fields between EU institutions and Member
States and amongst Member States themselves, to
such an extent that it has been argued that nowadays a
``relatively homogenous organizational phenomenon
has emerged''.9 This system has been described as one
of shared or ``integrated administration'', in order to
convey the idea that supranational and national
institutions cooperate and are linked together in the
process of implementation of European law.10
While these developments have signified the depar-
ture from the tradition dichotomy between direct and
indirect administration, these novel structures give rise
to many legal problems with regard to ``questions of
governance that are unique to the project of European
integration''.11 These questions concern mostly the
supervision of administrative action.12 Controlling the
operation of the EU integrated administration poses a
significant challenge because the system of legal
protection is based on a strictly dualistic approach,
in the sense that measures of the EU legal system fall
under the jurisdiction of the CJEU solely, while
measures of national authorities would fall under the
jurisdiction of the courts competent according to the
rules of the legal system from which the challenged
measure originates. Seen from a traditional point view
of executive federalism, this system would imply that,
in cases of indirect execution, private parties should be
able to challenge national implementation measures
before national courts (and there also possibly
challenge the validity of the enabling European
measure under the preliminary ruling procedure
contained in Article 267 TFEU). Where instead the
execution of EU law would be entrusted to the
Commission, private parties would be given access to
the European courts following the procedure of the
action for annulment contained in Article 263
TFEU.13
This division of tasks is being put under challenge
by the system of shared administration, because
decision-making procedures are more and more often
organized in a non-hierarchical structure, with differ-
ent actors, participating at different stages and with
different intensities, and often employing instruments
of an informal nature. In the following, one example
of procedure arising from the system of shared
administration will be examined and the gaps of
judicial protection will be identified.
III. The Habitats Directive and Judicial
Protection
The Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC)14 is an example of
an instrument creating a series of intertwined acts of
legislative and administrative nature at both national
and European level. The instrument itself is directed
towards the Member States and aims at preserving
and enhancing the biodiversity throughout the Union
by means of designating certain areas as natural
habitats which underlie strict protective measures.15
The procedure of designation is carried out in a
three-step-procedure which is set out in Article 4 of the
Habitats Directive.
Firstly, on the basis of criteria set out in the
Directive, each Member State is obliged to propose a
list of ecological sites which are, in the opinion of the
Member State, of Community importance. Within
three years of the notification of the Habitats
Directive, that list has to be transmitted to the
Commission, together with information on each site.16
7 Hofmann claims that ``this model has always been a
simplification of reality''. Herwig C.H. Hofmann, ``Compo-
site decision making procedures in EU administrative law'',
in Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. TuÈ rk (Eds),
Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law (Elgar, 2009),
137. The inadequacy of the dichotomy between direct and
indirect administration had already been put in question in
2006 in Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. TuÈ rk,
``An introduction to EU administrative governance''in
Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. TuÈ rk (eds.), EU
administrative governance (Elgar, 2006), 3.
8 Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. TuÈ rk, ``Conclu-
sions: Europe's integrated administration''in Herwig C.H.




11 Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. TuÈ rk ``An
introduction to EU administrative governance'', in Herwig
C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. TuÈ rk (eds.), EU admin-
istrative governance, 4.
12 See also on this point, concerning agencies and comitology
committees Deirdre Curtin, ``Holding (Quasi-) Autonomous
EU Administrative Actors to Public Account, European Law
Journal'', (2007) European Law Review, 523-541. And
generally see, Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ``Promot-
ing Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network
Approach'' (2007) European Law Journal, 542±562.
13 For a comprehensive introduction to both of these
procedures and the system of judicial protection in the EU
legal system, see Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law:
Text, Cases, and Materials (Fifth Edition, 2011, Oxford
University Press).
14 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora
[1992] OJ L-206/7 (hereafter: Habitats Directive).
15 Article 2 Habitats Directive.
16 Article 4(1) Habitats Directive. The procedure to adopt the
list of sites is laid down in Article 21 of the Habitats Directive.
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Secondly, on the basis of these national lists, the
Commission has to adopt a list of sites selected as sites
of Community importance.17 The Commission is given
six years from the notification of the Habitats
Directive to establish this list.18 Finally, Member
States are obliged to designate the sites in their
territory as ``special areas of conservation''as soon as
possible and within six years at most.19
The Habits Directive could, therefore, be charac-
terised as a three-step procedure, with preparatory
activities being carried out both at national and
European level, and a final measure being adopted
by the national authorities, as depicted in the figure
below.
Article 6 of the Habitats Directive sets out the
measures which the Member States are obliged to
adopt in order to ensure the conservation and
management of these designated sites.20 These mea-
sures may affect the legal positions of landowners
whose lands are part of a ``special area of conserva-
tion'', since the measures may encumber the property
rights of these landowners. The question thus arises as
to which avenues of judicial protection these land-
owners have, theoretically, at their disposal.
First of all, these landowners have the theoretical
possibility to challenge the list of sites of Community
importance proposed by the Member States pursuant
to Article 4(1) of the Habitats Directive before the
national courts. Secondly, they could challenge the
Commission Decision adopting the list of sites selected
as sites of Community importance under Article 4(2)
of the Habitats Directive before the European courts
in an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
Finally, they have the possibility to challenge the final
act of designation by the Member States required by
Article 4(4) of the Habitats Directive before the
national courts. In the course of that litigation, they
could invoke the illegality of the European measure
and invite the national court to send a preliminary
question of validity under Article 267 TFEU. These
three options will be considered, and the possibility of
obtaining judicial recourse against the measures taken
in each of the steps of the designation procedure will
be discussed in the following parts.
3.1 Step one: Member States' list
As mentioned above, the first step of the procedure is
for the Member State to issue a list with proposals of
areas which qualify under Annex III of the Directive
based on purely scientific information.21 In the
following, the availability of judicial protection
against the national list will be examined, using the
case study of the German legal system.
3.1.1. The German rules on reviewable acts. . .
In the German legal system, against the measure
through which the Member States designate the areas
which qualify as special protection areas, two actions
could potentially be brought, namely, an action for
annulment (Anfechtungsklage) and an action for a
declaratory judgment (Feststellungsklage). The action
for annulment, provided in Section 42 of the German
Law of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO), is
aimed at depriving an administrative measure (a
Verwaltungsakt) of legal effects. The declaratory
17 Article 4(2) Habitats Directive.
18 Article 4(3) Habitats Directive.
19 Article 4(4) Habitats Directive.
20 Under Article 6(1) of the Directive, Member States are
obliged to establish the necessary conservation measures for
the ``special areas of conservation'' with the aim to meet the
ecological requirements of the natural habitat types and
species present in the sites. Those measures may take the
form of statutory, administrative or contractual measures
or, if appropriate, management plans. Unlike Article 6(1) of
the Habitats Directive, Article 6(2) to (4) applies once an
area is placed on the list of sites of Community importance.
According to Article 6(2) of the Directive, Member States
must take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of the
natural habitats as well as disturbance of the species for
which the areas have been designated. With regard to
Article 6(3), any plan or project which is likely to have a
significant effect on the sites, has to be assessed according to
its implications for the site with regard to the site's
conservative measures. The national authorities are allowed
to agree on the plan or project only if it does not adversely
affect the integrity of the site concerned. Nevertheless, even
though a project has a negative effect on the site and in case
there are no alternative solutions, a project can be carried
out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest,
including those of a social and economic nature. In this case,
the Member State has to take compensatory measures to
ensure the coherence with the Natura 2000 network.
However, if the site hosts a priority natural habitat type,
only considerations relating to human health or public
safety may be raised.
21 Article 4(1) Habitats Directive.
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action, provided in Section 43 of the VwGO is aimed,
inter alia, at determining the nullity of an adminis-
trative act.22
The VwGO itself does not define the term
Verwaltungsakt. Nevertheless, Section 35 of the Ger-
man Law on Administrative Procedure (VwVfG)
provides for a legal definition of it. This definition
can also be used with regards to the provisions
concerning judicial protection before the administra-
tive courts. Pursuant to Section 35 VwVfG, a
Verwaltungsaktis ``any order, decision or other sover-
eign measure taken by an authority to regulate an
individual case in the sphere of public law and which is
intended to have a direct external legal effect''.
In the German legal system, the measure by which
Member States issue a list with a proposal of areas to
be designated as protected areas pose problems from
two perspectives in terms of availability of judicial
protection, since it lacks both the ``regulation''and the
``external legal effects''aspects for it to be considered
as a Verwaltungsakt.
The ``regulation''criterion demands that, with the
measure at issue, the administrative authority con-
cerned aims at creating legal consequences, such as the
setting up, modification and/or termination of rights
and duties in an administrative law relationship.23
Typical examples of measures with the ``regulation''e-
lement are prohibitions, orders, permissions, denials of
permissions etc. Measures that prepare a Verwaltung-
sakt are considered not to be administrative acts
themselves because they do not set up, modify or
terminate a legal relationship between the authority
and the individual.24
A Verwaltungsakt must also be capable of having a
``direct external legal effect''. This effect may be
detected only when and in so far as the measure is
aimed at legally affecting an individual's legal sphere
``outside''the administration.25 This requirement
excludes from the category of administrative acts
those preparatory decisions that are relevant only
within the administration, such as, for example, an
inspector's report upon which a decision for the
granting of a planning permission is based.
3.1.2 . . . and their application in practice
Based on these criteria, the German courts have
consistently denied the claims of landowners who tried
to challenge an administrative measure that had been
issued by the competent Land authority and contained
the list that was to be submitted to the Federal
Ministry for Environment. The latter is entrusted,
pursuant to the Bundesnaturschutzgesetz (i.e. the
German law which implemented the Habitats Direc-
tive in the German legal system),26 with compiling a
document containing all the sites indicated by the
Landadministrations and with submitting the final list
to the Commission.
The main line of argumentation followed by the
German courts to reject the applicants' claim was that
the measure by which the Land chose the potentially
protected areas and communicated them to the
Federal Ministry of Environment was to be considered
as an internal administrative measure, functional to
the final adoption of a final measure (i.e. the measure
designating certain sites as protected areas).27
Parallel to the main argument that the mere
proposal of the site does not have external effect, the
German administrative courts also mentioned various
other reasons to support the rejection of the claims.
It has been stated that the claimants were not
directly concerned by the measures, a condition which
can only be circumvented if the consequences are
especially severe ± a state which could not be proven
by most claimants.28 Additionally it has been laid out
by the courts that economic considerations of the
claimants are generally not to be taken into account
whenever the proposal of the sites is at stake.29 At this
point only environmental criteria are being considered
in order not to jeopardise the objectives of the
Directive, namely a coherent network of protected
sites, which only Commission is capable to create. The
needs of the individuals are only to be taken into
account at a later stage of the process, namely when
the Member States may object to or accept the list
22 For more information on the German system of remedies,
see e.g. Ferdinand O. Kopp Wolf-RuÈ diger Schenke Ralf
Peter Schenke, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung: Kommentar
(2013, 19th Ed., Beck).
23 BVerwG, Judgment of 20 May 1987, BVerwGE, 77, 268
(at 271).
24 This category comprises, for example, the reports drawn
up by experts belonging to an administrative authority, so
long as they do not have binding value for the authority
issuing the final decision. BVerwG, Judgment of 18 April
1969, BVerwGE, 32, 21; BVerwG, Judgment of 26 January
1996 ± 8 C 19.94, NJW, 1996, 2046.
25 BVerwG, Judgment of 25 October 1967, BVerwGE, 28,
145; BVerwG, Judgment of 22 May 1980, BVerwGE, 60,
144.
26 Bundesnaturschutzgesetz vom 29. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I S.
2542), amended by Article 3 of the Law of 28 July 2011
(BGBl. I S. 1690).
27 See e.g. VG Oldenburg, Decision of 20 January 2000 ± 1
B 4195/99, NuR, 2000, 295, confirmed in appeal by OVG
Niedersachsen, Decision of 24 March 2000 ± 3 M 439/00,
NuR, 2000, 298; VG Oldenburg, Decision of 2 February
2000 ± 1 B 82/00, NVwZ, 2001, 349, confirmed in appeal by
OVG Niedersachsen, Decision of 29 March 2000 ± 3 M 666/
00, NuR, 2000, 299; VG DuÈ sseldorf, Judgment of 21
December 2000 ± 4 K 6745/99, NVwZ, 2001, 591; VG
Minden, Judgment of 4 September 2001 ± 1 K 4082/00,
unpublished, confirmed in appeal by OVG Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Judgment of 14 May 2003 ± 8 A 4229/01,
unpublished.
28 See e.g. VGH Kassel, Judgment of 20 March 2001 ± 4 TZ
822/01, NVwZ 2001, 1178.
29 VG Frankfurt am Main, Judgment of 2 March 2001 ± 3
LG 501/01, NVwZ 2001, 1188.
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issued by the Commission, taking into account
economic, social and cultural considerations.30 The
same line of thought is followed in arguing that the
judicial protection of individuals is also assured at a
later stage of the designation process, hence there is no
need to assure judicial protection in the first stage of
the process.31
The arguments laid out above have continuously
been upheld by the German administrative courts,32
and confirmed by the German Federal Administrative
Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht),33 thereby closing
any possibility of judicial recourse against the first
step of the decision-making process.
3.2 Step two: Commission decision of designation
As mentioned above, the list with the proposals for the
protected areas are forwarded to the Commission
which has to adopt an official list of special protection
areas in the form of a decision pursuant to Article 288
TFEU.34
Decisions stemming from the Commission can be
challenged before the CJEU by way of an action for
annulment enshrined in Article 263 TFEU, which is the
main mechanism for the judicial review of Union acts.35
Due to the distinction into different classes of appli-
cants, natural and legal persons, as, for example,
landowners affected by a Commission decision of
designation, have only a limited access to the European
courts. According to Article 263(4) TFEU, applicants
challenging a measure which is not addressed to them
specifically, have to prove that the measure is of
``individual and direct concern''to them or that the
measure is a ``regulatory act not entailing implementing
measures''which is of direct concern to them.
Considering that the Commission designation
measure necessarily entails a measure of final designa-
tion at the Member State level, the standing test
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty for regulatory acts
does not apply to the case at end, despite the
Commission Decision at hand qualifying as a ``reg-
ulatory act''in accordance with the definition provided
by the case law of the CJEU.36 The landowners who
wish to challenge the Commission Decision will
therefore have to prove individual and direct concern.
In the following, the concepts of individual and
direct concern will be explained and the case law
concerning the Habitats Directive will be reviewed in
order to assess what the chances of success of
landowners have been until the present day.
3.2.1 The standing rules before the European courts . . .
The test of individual concern was elaborated upon by
the CJEU in the Plaumann case and has remained
virtually unchanged until the present day. This test
prescribes that applicants will only have access to the
court to challenge an EU measure, where they can
show that they belong to a so-called ``closed class'',
which is differently affected by the challenged measure
than all other natural or legal persons.37 This is a very
high hurdle for private applicant to overcome, and has
been much debated and criticized by doctrine.38
30 Ibid.
31 VG Schleswig, Judgment of 13 January 2000 ± 1 B 104/
99, NVwZ 2001, 348.
32 See e.g.; VG LuÈ neburg, Judgment of 6 April 2000 ± 7 B 7/
00, NVwZ 2001, 590; VG DuÈ sseldorf, Judgment of 21
December 2000 ± 4 K 6745/99, NVwZ 2001, 591; OVG
Bremen, Judgment of 31 May 2005 ± 1 A 346/02, NVwZ,
2005, 654; BVerwG, Judgment of 12 June 2008 ± 7 B 24/08,
NVwZ 2008, 1011.
33 BVerwG, Judgment of 7 April 2006 ± 4 B 58/05, NVwZ
2006, 822; BVerwG, Judgment of 12 June 2008 ± 7 B 24/08,
NVwZ, 2008, 1011.
34 Article 4(2) in conjunction with Article 21 Directive 92/
43/EEC.
35 For a comprehensive introduction to both of these
procedures and the system of judicial protection in the EU
legal system, see Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law:
Text, Cases, and Materials (Fifth Edition, 2011, Oxford
University Press).
36 See case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v
European Parliament and Council of the European Union
[2013] nyr. For a discussion of the case law leading up to this
ruling, see Haakon Roer-Eide and Mariolina Eliantonio,
The Meaning of Regulatory Act Explained: Are There Any
Significant Improvements for the Standing of Non-Privi-
leged Applicants in Annulment Actions?, German Law
Journal (2013), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.-
com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1581.
37 For example, in a case concerning seven Greek cotton
traders who sought judicial review of a Commission decision
that authorized France to impose a fixed-term quota on
cotton yarn imports from Greece to France, the Court
found that pre-existing import contracts differentiated the
applicant from potential importers and thus granted
standing to the applicants. See case 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki
v Commission [1985] ECR 207.
38 For criticism on the standing requirements of individual
applicants, see, ex multis, Angela Ward, ``Locus Standi under
Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty: Crafting a Coherent Test for
a Wobbly Polity''(2003) Yearbook of European Law, 45;
Anthony Arnull, ``Private Applicants and the Action for
Annulment since Codorniu''(2001) Common Market Law
Review, 7; Jose Manuel Martin CorteÂ s, ``Ubi ius, Ibi
Remedium? Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article
230(4) EC at a European Constitutional Crossroads''(2004)
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 233; A
Abaquense de Parfouru, ``Locus Standi of Private Applicants
under the Article 230 EC Action for Annulment: Any Lessons
to be Learnt from France?''(2007) Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law, 361; Adam Cygan, ``Protect-
ing the Interests of Civil Society in Community Decision-
making: The Limits of Article 230 EC''(2003) International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 995; Xavier Lewis, ``Stand-
ing of Private Claimants to Annul Generally Applicable
European Community Measures: If the System is Broken,
where Should it be Fixed?''(2006-2007) Fordham International
Law Journal, 1496; Albertina Albors-Llorens, ``Sealing The
Fate of Private Parties in Annulment Proceedings? The
General Court and the New Standing Test In Article 263(4)
TFEU'', Cambridge Law Journal, 52.
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With regard to a potential challenge to a Commis-
sion decision of designation, the greater hurdle is,
however, embodied in the requirement of direct
concern, given the nature of the procedure and its
multiple steps. The CJEU has consistently found that
a measure will be of direct concern to the applicant
when the latter's legal position has been directly
adversely affected. In other words, there must be a
direct link between the challenged measure and the
loss or damage that the applicant has suffered.39
Furthermore, the Court will deem a causation chain
to be broken if the contested Community measure
leaves any discretion to the addressees of the measure
who are responsible for its implementation.40
3.2.2 . . . and their application by the European courts
By applying the tests of individual and direct concern
described above, the European courts have consis-
tently denied standing to applicants who tried to
challenge a Commission Decision adopting the lists of
sites of Community importance pursuant to Article
4(2) of the Habitats Directive by an action of
annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
In the Rasso Freiherr case,41 the applicants brought
an action for annulment the Commission Decision
2004/69/EC of 22 December 2003 adopting the list of
sites of Community importance for the Alpine bio
geographical region.42 The applicants exploited their
forested lands by means of undertakings.43 The same
Commission Decision was challenged again in the
Kurt Martin Mayer case.44 In the case Markku
Sahlstedt,45 certain landowners and an association of
framers and foresters brought an action for annulment
before the CFI to challenge Commission Decision
2005/101/EC of 13 January 2005 adopting the list of
sites of Community importance for the Boreal bio
geographical region.46 Finally, in the case Robert
BenkoÈ and others, the challenge was against the
Commission Decision 2004/798/EC of 7 December
2004 which contained the list of sites of Community
importance for the Continental bio geographical
region.47 Amongst the applicants, two of them had
for many years led a project concerned with the
creation of a small electric power station on one of the
sites mentioned in the contested Decision. One of these
two applicants was, in addition, the property's owner.
The other applicants were owners of plots of land on
sites which are the subject of the contested decision
and operate there agricultural and forestry holdings.
In all these cases, the CFI adopted the same
reasoning to deny standing to the applicants to
challenge the above mentioned Commission Decisions
by way of an action for annulment. In particular,
having recalled its established case law on the notion
of direct concern, it considered that an individual
affected by a Community measure is considered to be
directly concerned by it where the Community
measure affects directly the legal sphere of the
applicants and if the action to be taken by the
Member State to implement that measure is auto-
matic. However, if the measure leaves the Member
State free to decide whether or not to act, or does not
require it to act in a specific way, it is the Member
State's action or inaction which directly concerns the
individual affected, and not the Community measure
itself.48
With regard to the first condition of direct concern,
the CFI held that the Commission Decision does not
affect directly the legal situation of the landowners.
Since the Commission Decision contains no provisions
as regards the system of protection of sites of
Community importance such as conservative measures
or authorisation procedures, it does not affect the
rights or obligations of the landowners or the existence
of those rights. Consequently, the inclusion of those
sites in the list of sites of Community importance
imposes no obligations on economic operators or
private persons.49
With regard to the second condition of direct
concern, the CFI concluded that the Habitats Direc-
tive is only binding on the Member State as to the
result to be achieved. It leaves it open to the Member
States to choose the conservation measures to be
undertaken and the authorisation procedures to be
followed is left to the competent national authorities.50
All obligations necessitate a measure on the part of the
39 Cases 41-44/70 ,International Fruit Company BV v
Commission [1971] ECR 411. In this case, employees of a
merging company were not granted locus standi to challenge
a Commission decision allowing the merger, due to the fact
that possible employment terminations would not be the
direct consequence of the Commission decision.
40 See, for example, case 69/69, Alcan Aluminium Raeren v
Commission [1970] ECR 385; case 222/83, Municipality of
Differdange v Commission[1984] ECR 2889.
41 Case T-136/04, Rasso Freiherr von Cramer-Klett and
Rechtlerverband Pfronten v Commission of the European
Communities [2006] ECR II-01805.
42 OJ [2004] L-14/21.
43 The first applicant was the owner of land in the site of
Community importance set out in the contested Commis-
sion Decision. The second applicant was a corporation
formed of the owners of lands in the site of Community
importance.
44 Case T-137/04,Kurt Martin Mayer and Others v Commis-
sion of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-01825.
45 Case T-150/05, Markku Sahlstedt and Others v Commis-
sion of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-01851.
46 OJ [2005] L-40/1.
47 Case T-122/05, Robert BenkoÈ and Others v Commission of
the European Communities [2006] II-02939.
48 Case T-150/05, Markku Sahlstedt and Others v Commis-
sion of the European Communities at para. 53. See also case
T-223/01 Japan Tobacco and JT International v Parliament
and Council [2002] ECR II-3259, para. 46.
49 Case T-150/05, Markku Sahlstedt and Others v Commis-
sion of the European Communities at para. 54.
50 Ibid. at para. 60.
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Member State concerned, in order to specify how it
intends to implement the obligation in question,
whether it relates to necessary conservation measures
(Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive), steps appro-
priate to avoid deterioration of the site (Article 6(2) of
the Habitats Directive), or the agreement to be given
by the competent national authorities to a project
likely to have a significant effect on it (Article 6(3) and
(4) of the Habitats Directive).51 As a result, the Court
of First Instance concluded that the applicants were
not directly concerned by the Commission Decisions
they were challenging.
Only the applicants in the Markku Sahlstedt case
appealed to the Court of Justice by requesting it to set
aside the order of the CFI and to annul the
Commission Decision adopted pursuant to Article
4(2) of the Habitats Directive.52
Contrary to the CFI, in his opinion of 23 October
2008, Advocate General Bot concluded that the
landowners were directly and individually concerned
by the Commission Decision and that the case should
be sent back to the CFI so that it could decide on the
merits. In the view of Advocate General Bot, the
contested decision directly affected the legal situation
of the landowners for two reasons.53
Firstly, he argued that the Commission Decision
constitutes a measure having adverse effects on land-
owners since it deprives them of their right to use their
land as they wish.54 The consequence of the Commis-
sion Decision is to encumber the landowner's property
rights with new restrictions which were not existent at
the time when they acquired their rights. In the AG's
view, the Commission Decision can result in economic
or social damage in the form of a decrease in the value
of the land or even the total or partial cessation of
farming or forestry activities.55 Secondly, Member
States have only a very limited discretion in the
implementation of the Decision. First of all, it
becomes clear from the wording of Article 4(4) of
the Habitats Directive, that once the Commission has
identified an area of land as a site of Community
importance, the Member States have no margin of
discretion to designate that site as a ``special con-
servation area''.56 Furthermore, all measures such as
conservation measures (Article 6(1) of the Habitats
Directive) or steps appropriate to avoid deterioration
of the site (Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive) being
directly linked to the classification of the landowners'
property as sites of Community importance.57 Accord-
ing to him, the fact that the Member States may enjoy
discretion as to the conservation measure to be
adopted does not have any significance with regard
to the effects of the contested Commission Decision.58
After finding that the landowners are directly
concerned, Advocate General Bot determined whether
the landowners were individually concerned by the
Commission Decision. Having recalled the require-
ment set out by the CJEU in order to determine
individual concern, he concluded that the landowners
were part of a limited class whose members are
especially affected by the contested decision based on
three reasons.59 Firstly, the landowners are in a special
situation because they have property rights in areas of
land covered by the contested decision. Secondly, the
landowners were identifiable by the Commission at the
time when it adopted the Decision pursuant to Article
4 (2) Habitats Directive. Thirdly, the contested
decision affects the landowner's legal situation and
the free exercise of their rights.60
Interestingly, the Court of Justice switched the
order of examination of the standing requirements
and, unlike the Advocate General, it held that the
applicants were not individually concerned.61 The
Court recalled that the fact that it is possible to
determine more or less precisely the number, or even
the identity, of the persons to whom a measure applies
by no means implies that that measure must be
regarded as being of individual concern to those
persons where it is established that that application
takes effect by virtue of an objective legal or factual
situation defined by the measure in question.62
The Court of Justice held that the Commission
Decision adopted pursuant to Article 4(2) of the
Habitats Directive was of concern to the appellants
only in so far as they had property rights in the lands
covered by some of the sites of Community interest.
Consequently, the Commission Decision affects them
by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation
defined by the Commission Decision and not in
accordance with criteria specific to the category of
landowners. Moreover, the Commission Decision was
51 Ibid. at para 59.
52 Case C-362/06 P, Markku Sahlstedt and Others v
Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-
02903.
53 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 23
October 2008 [2009] ECR I-02903, paras. 64-77.
54 Ibid. at para. 69.
55 Ibid. at para. 70.
56 Ibid. at para. 90.
57 Ibid. at paras. 71- 73.
58 Ibid. at para. 100.
59 Ibid. at para 110.
60 Ibid. at paras. 111-119.
61 Case C-362/06 P, Markku Sahlstedt and Others v
Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-
02903. For a critical comment to this ruling, see Ludwig
KraaÁ mer, ``Comment on case C-362/06 P, Sahlstedt and
Others v. Commission ± Judgment of the Court of Justice
(Second Chamber), 23.4.2009'', Journal of European Envir-
onmental and Planning Law (2009), 411-415.
62 Case C-362/06 P, Markku Sahlstedt and Others v
Commission of the European Communities [2009]. See also
Case C-451/98, Antillean Rice Mills v Council [2001] ECR I-
08949, para. 52; case C-96/01 P, Galileo and Galileo
International v Council [2002] ECR I-04025, para. 38; Case
C-503/07 P Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission
[2008] ECR I-02217, para. 70.
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not adopted in the light of the specific situation of the
landowners. Consequently, the Commission Decision
could not be regarded as a group of individual
decisions addressed to each landowner.63 As a result,
the Court of Justice held that the applicants did not
have standing to challenge the Commission Decision
on the basis that the applicants were not individually
concerned and without considering whether they were
directly concerned by the Commission Decision.
In conclusion, according to the case law of the
European courts, no action lies against the Commis-
sion measure of designation of certain national areas
as special protection areas, because of the lack of
individual and direct concern.
3.3 Step three: Member States' final designation
As a last step in that designation process the Member
State has to officially designate the special protection
area identified in the Commission decision.64 In the
following, the possible avenues of judicial protection
in the German legal system will be examined and their
chances of success will be analysed.
3.3.1 The German rules on available remedies . . .
In the German legal system there is a set of different
possibilities for individuals to challenge the final
measure of designation by the national authorities.
The primary means in order to challenge the final
designation is the Normenkontrollverfahren in which a
national norm is examined as to its validity with
regards to a higher ranking rule of law.65 The
availability of this procedure depends on whether a
Land has approved its integration into its own legal
system; if so, the procedure is governed by the
conditions set out in Section 47 VwGO.
In cases in which the Member State have a relatively
wide margin of discretion when giving effect to the EU
legislation, the higher ranking rule of law can be the
German Basic Law, and, for the purposes of the
situation under examination, Article 14 thereof on
property rights.66 Nevertheless, in the majority of cases
concerning the Habitats Directive, the Member States
will not have such a significant margin of discretion. In
such cases, the relevant higher-ranking norm can be
one stemming from primary and secondary European
Union law.67 For the present purpose, this would
mean that the European Union principle of a right to
property as guaranteed in Article 17 of the European
Charter on Fundamental Rights could be invoked.
Next to the Normenkontrollverfahren concerned
landowners have the possibility to invoke another
procedure in the context of challenging the final
designation, namely the action for performance
(Verpflichtungsklage).68 The landowner seeks to
acquire permission for a certain activity (provided
the activity requires prior permission according to the
Habitats Directive) and upon denial issued by the
administrative authorities appeals against this deci-
sion.69
As a final possibility, the individual can have resort
to the Feststellungsklage (action for declaration)
provided in Section 43 VwGO. This procedure can
be used whenever the individual plans activities on the
property which do not require prior permission, but
which are nonetheless potentially hazardous.70
3.3.2 . . . and their chances of success
The Normenkontrollverfahren is a procedure of objec-
tive control which could in principle be open to
landowners against the final determination of designa-
tion of an area as a special protection area. It is
however hardly going to be successful since it will be
hard for the applicants to prove that the measure of
determination as such infringed on their right to
property as enshrined at EU level.71
As regards the Verpflichtungsklage and the Feststel-
lungsklage, while both avenues would be open in
principle to applicant, they would be of only limited
use.
Concerning the Verpflichtungsklage, since the
potential measure of denial which the applicant could
be challenging, can only be based on the criteria pre-
defined in the Habitats Directive, the only way in
which the final designation decision can effectively be
challenged is by way of a referral to the Court of
Justice.72 This is rooted in the fact that the margin of
63 Case C-362/06 P Markku Sahlstedt and Others v
Commission of the European Communities [2009] at para.
32-34.
64 Art. 4(4) Habitats Directive.
65 Section 47 VwGO.
66 See e.g. BVerfG, Judgment of 27 July 2004 ± 1 BvR 1270/
04, NVwZ, 2004, 1346.
67 Wolfgang Kahl and Klaus F. Garditz, ``Rechtsschutz im
europaÈ ischen Kontrollverbund am Beispiel der FHH-
Gebietsfestsetzung'', Natur und Recht (2005), 563.
68 Section 42 VwGO; Wolfgang Kahl and Klaus F. Garditz,
``Rechtsschutz im europaÈ ischen Kontrollverbund am Beis-
piel der FHH-Gebietsfestsetzung'', 563.
69 § 42(1) VwGO.
70 Wolfgang Kahl and Klaus F. Garditz, ``Rechtsschutz im
europaÈ ischen Kontrollverbund am Beispiel der FHH-
Gebietsfestsetzung'', 563.
71 See e.g. case Joined cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker
Aquacultur Ltd and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd v The Scottish
Ministers [2003] I-07411, where the CJEU held that
``fundamental rights are not absolute rights but must be
considered in relation to their social function. Consequently,
restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those rights,
in particular in the context of a common organisation of the
markets, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond
to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community
and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the
very substance of those rights'' (para 68).
72 Wolfgang Ewer, ``Rechtsschutz gegenuÈ ber der Auswahl
und Festsetzung von FFH-Gebieten``, Natur und Recht
(2000), 361-362.
European Energy and Environmental Law Review August 2014 123
Judicial Review in an Integrated Administration
discretion of the Member States is close to inexistent,
which means that final measures of designation could
only be challenged on grounds of invalidity of the
underlying Commission Decision. Because no national
court is empowered to decide over the validity of said
instrument,73 the only possibility for applicants to de
facto challenge a final measure of designation is by
asking the national court to refer a question of validity
to the CJEU.
Similarly, with regards to the Feststellungsklage, the
procedure (which would aim at determining that the
individual is allowed to pursue certain dangerous
activities) would only serve as a way of incidentally
contesting the validity of the criteria set out in the
Community list stemming from the Commission which
itself needs to adhere to primary and secondary EU
law ± an assessment which eventually can only be
carried out by the CJEU.74
In conclusion, landowners affected by the inclusion
of their property in the list of ``special protection
areas''have access to national courts to challenge the
final measure of designation, but only as a gateway to
access the European level through the preliminary
ruling proceedings. The main problem regarding the
questionable efficiency of challenging the final desig-
nation decision lies in the inexistent leeway of the
Member State's authorities. Due to the lacking margin
of discretion on part of the Member State the national
court's freedom in coming to a decision on the validity
of the final designation decision is significantly
curtailed, and the final decision on the validity of the
national designation thus de facto lies in the hands of
the CJEU in case the national administrative court
decides to refer the matter.
3.4 Back to step two? Indirect challenge of the
Commission Decision before the national court
In case an applicant would gain access to court in a
challenge against the designating decision of the
Member State under the Habitats Directive, it
becomes possible to challenge the validity of the
inclusion of the concerned site into the list of special
protection sites as determined by the Commission
decision. In fact, the CJEU has been very keen on
stressing that ``the judicial protection of natural or
legal persons who are unable, by reason of the
conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth
paragraph of Article 230 EC, to challenge directly
Community measures . . . must be guaranteed effec-
tively by a right of action before the national
courts''.75 In case such a question of validity is actually
raised before a national court, the national court, if it
entertains doubts as to the actual lawfulness of the
contested measure, has the obligation to refer a
preliminary question to the Court of Justice, as it is
only the this court that has the power to annul EU
measures.
Although the preliminary ruling procedure fulfils
the task of judicial protection in the way that it grants
individuals a means to question allegedly invalid EU
acts, it is debatable whether preliminary ruling is an
adequate substitution for direct means of judicial
protection such as Art. 263 TFEU. Hence, even where
individuals can bring an action before the national
courts, the mechanism of preliminary rulings does not
always guarantee an effective remedy to applicants.76
Indeed, several problems (many of which have been
highlighted by AG Jacobs in his opinion on the UPA
case)77 can be observed with regard to the idea of
national courts being a correct forum for cases in
which the validity of EU legislation is in question.
In particular, as AG Jacobs considered, national
courts are only competent to assess whether the
applicant's arguments ``raise sufficient doubts about
the validity of the impugned measure to justify a request
for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice''.78
Furthermore, AG Jacobs observed that access to the
CJEU via the preliminary reference procedure is not
available to applicants as a matter of right, since
national courts (with the exclusion of courts of last
instance) may refuse to refer a question of validity of an
EU measure to the CJEU or might err in their
assessment of the validity of the measure and decline
to refer a question to the CJEU on that basis.79 In
addition, even where a reference is made, the prelimin-
ary questions are formulated by the national courts,
with the consequence that applicants' claims might be
redefined or that the questions referred might limit the
range of measures whose validity is being challenged
before the national court.80 Furthermore, one may add,
the actual communication on issues of European law
entirely occurs between the national court and the Court
of Justice in preliminary rulings proceedings. The parties
that raised the question on Community law do not have
a party status before the Court of Justice.
73 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt LuÈbeck-Ost
[1987] ECR 04199.
74 Wolfgang Ewer, ``Rechtsschutz gegenuÈ ber der Auswahl
und Festsetzung von FFH-Gebieten``, 361-362.
75 Sahlstedt, para. 43.
76 Cornelia Koch, ``Locus Standi of private applicants under
the EU constitution: Preserving gaps in the protection of
individual's right to an effective remedy'', European Law
Review (2005), 515; Jose-Manuel CorteÂ s Martin, ``Ubi ius,
Ibi Remedium? ± Locus Standi of Private Applicants under
Article 230(4) EC at a European Constitutional Cross-
roads'', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law (2004), 239.
77 Case C-50/00, UnioÂn de PequenÄos Agricultores (UPA) v
Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-06677.
78 Opinion of Advocate General in UPA, para 41. In this
context, Brown and Morijn also correctly mention the
potential disparities which may arise from different evalua-
tions by the national courts. See Christopher Brown and
John Morijn, ``Case C-263/02 P, Commission v. JeÂ go-QueÂ reÂ
& Cie SA''(2004) Common Market Law Review, 1650-1651.
79 Opinion of the AG in UPA, para 42.
80 Ibid.
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Finally, AG Jacobs in his opinion in the UPA case
considered that proceedings brought before a national
court are more disadvantageous for individuals
compared to an action for annulment under Article
263 TFEU, since they involve delays and extra costs.
The negative effects of the potential delay might be
avoided by granting the applicant adequate interim
measures. National courts have the jurisdiction to do
so (on the basis of the ruling in Zuckerfabrik)81 but, as
the AG pointed out, the decision of whether to grant
interim measures is subject to discretionary conditions
by the national courts and is anyway effective only
within the legal system in which the measure is
ordered, thus obliging the applicant to bring multiple
actions in all Member States in which their interests
are affected by the contested measure.82 This stands in
contrast with the power of the European courts, under
Article 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU, to grant EU-wide
interim measures.
In conclusion, once having gained access to national
courts against the final measure of designation,
individuals have the chance to indirectly challenge
the Commission decision of designation through the
preliminary ruling proceedings; however, as shown
above, one cannot consider the preliminary ruling as
an adequate substitute for effective judicial protection
of landowners who claim to be adversely affected by
the Commission decision of designation.
IV.Conclusions and Recommendations
The analysis of Directive 92/43/EEC and the example
of the German system of judicial protection have
shown that the system of shared administration may
bring about significant gaps of effective judicial
protection. Closely intertwined administrative proce-
dures between the Commission and the national
administrative bodies create a complex system of
decision-making to which the system of judicial
protection has not been able to keep up.
As shown above, when the administrative acts are
of preparatory, internal nature thus lacking external
binding effect, individuals are a priori barred from
contesting those acts. Relying on the main argument
that the measure containing the national lists of sites
to be sent to the Commission is, as such, not capable
of changing a landowner's legal sphere, the German
courts have consistently denied access to applicants
who wished to challenge the first step of the
designation process prescribed by the Habitats Direc-
tive.
Towards the legally binding decisions by the
Commission, severely restrictive standing require-
ments pose a fairly high hurdle to direct claims of
validity. The European courts have, to date, always
denied claims by landowners against the Commission
Decisions of designation on the grounds, mostly, of
lack of direct concern, with the argument that, given
the presence of a further step in the decision-making
process at national level, there is no direct link
between the applicant's change of position and the
Commission Decision.
The denial of access to court at European level
problem is only partially resolved through the
possibility of access to the national courts in a
challenge against the final measure of designation.
As shown above, national courts, when being con-
fronted with a challenge against the final designation
decision, do not have sufficient leeway to decide on the
validity of the national measure, as the latter
ultimately merely transposes the underlying Commis-
sion Decision. This means that the only way to obtain
a judicial protection is by way of having the case
referred to the European Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling. The recourse to the indirect review
of the Commission Decision does not seem, however,
to be an adequate substitution of a direct challenge,
since there is no guarantee that the national court will
refer the case to the Court of Justice, and the
procedure will entail more time and costs for an
individual if compared to a direct action.
The real crux of the problem, therefore, lies in the
nature of the decision-making process, i.e. a typical
example of the system of shared administration, in
which the judicial protection mechanisms currently in
existence seem to have trouble to allocate responsi-
bility for a the content of a decision. While Member
State courts (the German ones, in the case under
examination) seem to think that the responsibility for
the decision lies with the Commission, the opposite
seems to be true for the European courts.
Given the unsatisfactory nature of this situation,
the question arises as to how these gaps may possibly
be filled. At first glance it may seem as though a
change of the national courts attitude vis-aÁ-vis the
concept of reviewable would be the easiest and most
suitable step to achieve a more complete protection for
individuals. What constitutes a reviewable act at
Member States level is, in principle, determined by
national procedural rules, in application of the
principle of national procedural autonomy.83 How-
ever, in Oleificio Borelli, the CJEU held that a national
measure which prevented legal action from being
taken against a mere administrative preparatory act
would be in violation of the right of access to justice.84
In this case, an Italian firm, sought the annulment of a
Commission measure, on the grounds that the under-
81 Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik SuÈderdith-
marschen AG vHauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest
GmbH v Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415.
82 Opinion of the AG in UPA, para 44.
83 Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989; case 45/76, Comet
[1976] ECR 2043.
84 Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli S.p.A. v Commission of the
European Communities [1992] ECR I-6313.
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lying measure adopted by the competent national
authority was void. The CJEU ruled that, while it had
no jurisdiction to rule on the unlawfulness of a
measure adopted by a national authority, the negative
opinion issued by the national authorities should have
been challenged before a national court and that the
requirement of effective judicial protection obliges the
Member States, ``to regard an action brought for that
purpose as admissible even if the domestic rules of
procedure do not provide for this in such a case''.85
While this requirement imposed by the European
courts seems to fill the possible gaps of judicial
protection, it does leave some questions open. First
of all, there is no assurance that national courts,
misapplying the national procedural rules to the
contrary, will admit claims against national prepara-
tory measures. Individuals may forget to rely on this
case law before the national courts and courts
themselves may be unaware of or unwilling to apply
the European requirements. In the German case law
discussed above, for example, neither did the appli-
cants rely on this case law, nor did the courts discuss it
of their own motion. Furthermore, reliance on
national courts' willingness to set their own procedural
rules aside may bring about a certain lack of legal
certainty as well as the risk of unacceptable differential
treatment if national courts would come to different
conclusions in case of the same or similar preparatory
measures taken in the context of composite proce-
dures.
Alternatively, it could be a desirable goal to modify
the application of the standing requirements for
individuals under to bring a direct action under Article
263(4) TFEU. Even where the current interpretation
of the concepts of individual and direct concern were
to be maintained, it is submitted that, in the case of
landowners wishing the challenge the Commission
Decision of designation, the requirements should be
deemed as met.
Indeed, as AG Bot considered in his opinion in the
Sahlstedt case, the Commission Decision deprives
landowners of their right to freely use their land,
resulting possibly in economic or social damage, with
Member States having only a very limited discretion in
the implementation of the Decision. Furthermore,
even in application of the strict Plaumann criteria, it
can hardly be denied that, because of the property
rights acquired before the designation of the area as a
special protection area, the landowners are in a
peculiar situation vis-aÁ-vis other landowners and were
identifiable by the Commission at the time when it
adopted the Decision.
A final solution might be to modify Article 267
TFEU and place the national courts under an
obligation to refer a question to the Court of Justice
in all cases in which the validity of an EU measure is
contested. Apart from the fact that this solution may
not solve the problems connected to the increased time
and costs for applicants vis-aÁ-vis a direct action, as
Brown and Morijn correctly point out, this would be a
deeply unattractive scenario: the Court of Justice
would be then be swamped with questions coming
from the national courts ``thus finding itself in
precisely the position it seeks to avoid with its
individual concern case law ± an extremely heavy case
load''.86
More in general, the system of ``integrated admin-
istration''requires the necessity to depart from the
strict dualistic approach to judicial review. As has
been observed, the current mechanism of preliminary
ruling only works vertically (i.e. from national courts
to EU and not between national courts) and only one
way (never from EU to national courts).87 As this
paper has shown, the traditional two-level structure
clashes with the reality of decision-making which is
more and more organized in a network structure, and
the existence of the preliminary ruling in its current
form does not fully serve to fill the existing gaps.
Hence the necessity to use the same network structure
for the judicial supervision of the administrative
action. A possibility to adapt judicial review to the
system of integrated administration would be by
setting up a system whereby ``judicial review could
be undertaken by one court with supervision of all
participants in the administrative network'',88 possibly
by the court competent according to the procedural
rules of the legal system to which the authority which
took the final decision belongs. In the case of the
Habitats Directive, landowners could be able to bring
a claim against the final measure of designation, with
the European courts being able to supervise the
application and interpretation of the Directive by the
national court. This, would, however, imply a
recognition of the intertwined nature of the systems
of judicial review of national and European courts and
a final farewell to, on the one hand, national
sovereignty on the organization of the judiciary, and,
on the other hand, to the current monopoly of the
European courts on the interpretation and application
of EU law.
85 Ibid. para. 13.
86 See Brown, C. and Morijn, J. (2004) ``Comment on JeÂgo-
QueÂreÂ'', 1652.
87 Also observed by Herwig C.H. Hofmann ``Decision
making in EU Administrative Law ± The Problem of
Composite Procedures'', Administrative Law Review (2009),
213-214.
88 Ibid, 214.
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